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Synthesis, part of a Special Feature on Advancing the Understanding of Behavior in Social-Ecological Systems: Results from Lab
and Field Experiments
Experimental platforms for behavioral experiments on social-ecological
systems
Marco A. Janssen 1, Allen Lee 1 and Timothy M. Waring 2
ABSTRACT. Recently, there has been an increased interest in using behavioral experiments to study hypotheses on the governance of
social-ecological systems. A diversity of software tools are used to implement such experiments. We evaluated various publicly available
platforms that could be used in research and education on the governance of social-ecological systems. The aims of the various platforms
are distinct, and this is noticeable in the differences in their user-friendliness and their adaptability to novel research questions. The
more easily accessible platforms are useful for prototyping experiments and for educational purposes to illustrate theoretical concepts.
To advance novel research aims, more elaborate programming experience is required to either implement an experiment from scratch
or adjust existing experimental software. There is no ideal platform best suited for all possible use cases, but we have provided a menu
of options and their associated trade-offs.
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INTRODUCTION
The quest for sustainability is fraught with social dilemmas
regarding the use of shared resources. Social dilemmas occur
when individual incentives conflict with collective interests. This
is especially apparent with shared resources such as forests, fish,
clean and fresh water, and fertile land. Garrett Hardin (1968)
argued that resource users cannot govern their own resources and
that a tragedy of the commons is unavoidable without the
establishment of state control or privatization of the shared
resource. To the contrary, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues
showed that such tragedy is avoidable (Ostrom 1990, Dietz et al.
2003) by gathering many empirical examples of common
resources that are successfully managed by local communities that
create innovative institutional arrangements.  
An important contribution to the success of the study of
governance of common pool resources is the theoretical
framework called the institutional analysis and development
framework, which is designed to help understand the complexity
of empirical cases of institutional design (Ostrom 2005). A recent
extension of this work is the emphasis of the social and ecological
contextual variables in the social-ecological systems framework
(Ostrom 2009). The study of governance of social-ecological
systems cannot be performed by one methodological approach
but requires investigation using different approaches such as case
study analysis, formal modeling, and behavioral experiments
(Poteete et al. 2010). We focus on experimental methods.  
Behavioral experiments in the laboratory and field are
increasingly used to test hypotheses emerging from theory and
case study research (Ostrom et al. 1994, Poteete et al. 2010).
Experiments have been performed with university student
populations in various countries, as well as nonstudent
populations, including farmers in rural India or fishers from the
coast of Colombia (Anderies et al. 2011, Waring and Bell 2013).
These experiments show that overharvesting of common
resources happens as theory predicts if  participants cannot
communicate and cannot use costly punishment. In contrast to
theory, and in line with case study research, experiments show
that communication and costly punishment reduce the
overharvesting of common resources (Poteete et al. 2010).
Communication without the ability to enforce promises, called
cheap talk, is not expected to have an effect on rational selfish
actors, yet leads to a significant increase in group cooperation
(Balliet 2010). The option to reduce the earnings of others at a
cost to oneself, i.e., costly punishment, is not expected to be used.
However, both cheap talk and costly punishment are found to
have a significant effect and confirm observations in case study
analysis (Ostrom et al. 1992).  
One limitation of early public goods and common pool resource
experiments for the use of studying governance of social-
ecological systems was the lack of relevant ecological complexity.
Scholars have begun to explore the consequences of more specific
and relevant ecological complexity in the study of social dilemmas
in social-ecological systems (Janssen et al. 2010, McAllister et al.
2011, Prediger et al. 2011, García-Gallego et al. 2012, Anderies
et al. 2013, Cardenas et al. 2013, Kimbrough and Wilson 2013).
A result of increased scientific interest in social-ecological
experiments has been the parallel proliferation of experimental
software designed to implement them. Experimental software
platforms have different aims, code bases, features, and user
communities. This diversity in software platforms is valuable but
also creates difficult choices for researchers to determine which
platform is best suited for their needs and presents challenges for
standardization and interoperability, reproducibility, extensibility,
and reuse.  
One of our purposes is to address common inquiries by colleagues
and students on how to start conducting social-ecological
behavioral experiments. Beyond understanding the methodologies
for designing and running experiments (Friedman and Sunder
1994, Roth and Kagel 1995, Camerer 2003), it is important to
know what kinds of software tools are available and appropriate.
Like most software applications, software experiments are
typically developed for a specific set of research questions and
assumptions, and advanced programming experience is needed
for major adjustments. However, most frameworks provide
“extension points” that enable experimenters to modify features
of an experiment via configuration parameters or even custom
1Arizona State University, 2University of Maine
Ecology and Society 19(4): 20
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art20/
programming logic. Some experiments can also be implemented
via standard tools or platforms used for other purposes. We review
the various software tools and platforms available for conducting
behavioral social-ecological experiments with an eye toward
clarifying the options. We restrict experimental platforms to those
that are publicly available and include examples of public good
and/or common pool resource experiments. We evaluate these
platforms on their goals, design, abilities, and usage. We do not
intend to provide an overview of experimental platforms in
experimental economics but purposely focus on a specific problem
domain for scholars from interdisciplinary backgrounds who are
interested in using experimental approaches for their studies of
the interactions between humans and their environment.
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE OF
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
We discuss some common variations of standard experiments.
This will provide a perspective on the scope of possible
experiments and the justification for certain choices of platforms.
All relevant experiments are designed to test specific hypotheses.
To do so, we define different treatments. For example, to test the
effect of communication, we will need a number of groups with
and without communication allowed. A sufficient number of
groups need to be formed such that nonparametric tests can be
used to test significance of the differences attributable to the
treatment effect.  
Experiments are often designed intentionally to be simplistic and
narrow in scope to focus on specific research questions and
exclude sources of noise present in the real world. Results from
experiments by themselves do not prove the effect of an
intervention and are part of a larger body of experimental results
and findings from other studies that accumulatively lead to
improved insights (Poteete et al. 2010).  
Because social-ecological systems often contain social dilemmas
with environmental implications, we limit the scope of our
examination to experimental platforms used to examine public
good and common pool resource scenarios. Experiments reported
in other papers in this special issue on behavioral experiments for
social-ecological systems are variations of the public good and
common pool resources.  
In a standard linear public good experiment, a group of N 
participants receives an endowment (w) every round. In each
round, participants decide independently how much (X) of the
endowment to invest in a public fund and how much to invest in
a private fund. The total investment in the public fund is multiplied
by (m) and shared equally among the participants. A participant’s
earnings in a given round are the remainder of the private fund
(w – X) plus an even share of the public fund (m/N) × sum X. A
selfish rational actor will not invest anything in the public fund.
If  all participants are selfish and rational, the earnings will be
equal to the initial endowment. The social optimum solution is
obtained, by contrast, if  every participant invests his or her entire
endowment in the public good, increasing the earnings by m.  
Common pool resource experiments are similar to public good
experiments except that the decision to be made is how much to
extract from a common pool resource in contrast to how much
to invest in a private fund. A selfish rational actor will harvest as
much as possible and will expect others to do the same. The social
optimum resource consumption is a lower consumption that
provides social benefits such as resource longevity, or greater
harvest per unit effort. In both public good and common pool
resource scenarios, N participants make numerical investments
or harvesting decisions in parallel, every round.  
We use the institutional analysis and development framework
(Ostrom 2005) to discuss what kinds of variations of so-called
action situations we can explore in experiments (Fig. 1).
Participants can fill positions that allow certain actions.
Individuals have control over the actions that lead to outcomes
and have information about actions, outcomes, and their linkages,
as well as their costs and benefits. We can vary who participates,
e.g., students and farmers; in which kind of ecology, varying in
spatial and temporal dynamics; and from which “culture,” e.g.,
rural/urban populations, hunter-gatherers, or small-scale rice
farmers in Nepal. In the experiments, we can vary the production
functions, i.e., net cost and benefits, which may reflect different
types of ecologies, i.e., how the actions of individuals affect the
payoff of other participants. The ecological context can also affect
the positions participants have, e.g., connected in networks or via
asymmetric interactions; when decisions can be made; and who
has information about the actions and earnings of others. The
variations can be endless yet are guided by observations in case
studies and a theoretical framework that captures the interactions
of people.
Fig. 1. Experimental models of social-ecological systems are
simplifications of real-world scenarios designed to focus on the
human behavioral dynamics of most interest. This figure is an
adaptation of the institutional analysis and development
framework of Figs. 1.2 and 2.1 of Ostrom (2005).
Modern computer software and programming languages now
make it possible for experimenters to create complex, interactive,
multiparticipant experiments with highly specific social roles and
varying environmental resource conditions. Computer systems
have expanded the realm of testable ecological and social
conditions, as well as the depth of data that can be collected from
such experiments, i.e., chat data and real-time attention tracking.
However, the methodological challenges in this experimental
research do not stem primarily from a need for greater complexity.
Instead, the biggest constraints for social-ecological experimentation
are (1) the difficulty of capturing the complexity of social-
ecological systems in tractable behavioral experiments and (2) the
challenge of creating robust and reusable experimental software
with limited time and funding.  
We focus on laboratory experiments. There is also an increasing
use of field experiments to study social-ecological systems. In field
experiments, participants are recruited beyond the traditional
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student population, e.g., farmers and fishers, and these kinds of
experiments have specific challenges and opportunities
(Harrison and List 2004, Anderies et al. 2011). Social-ecological
field experiments are typically deployed to study behavior in a
particular social-ecological system, such as cooperative
irrigation in a multicaste village (Waring and Bell 2013), forest
use (Cardenas 2000), artisanal fisheries (Castillo et al. 2011), and
pastoralism (Prediger et al. 2011). Field experiments on social-
ecological systems often attempt to mimic the local social and
ecological contexts in a stylized way to collect insights from local
resource users on governance of common resources. Although
we focus on laboratory experiments, software systems that are
used for laboratory experiments can be the starting point for
field experiments, and the two domains have increasingly similar
technical needs.  
The subsequent discussion of the platforms is aimed at scholars
from diverse disciplines who study social-ecological systems and
are interested in exploring options for their research and
teaching. A good way to start is to try out existing experiments
in class as an educational experience on collective action. When
one desires to continue to use this for research, the best platforms
to use depend on programming skills and specific research
questions.
Experimental domains
Social-ecological experiments are used in a growing number of
domains, including the laboratory, the field, the classroom, and
online. Current tools allow experimenters to vary participants,
i.e., numbers and types; production functions, i.e., net costs and
benefits; environmental details, i.e., resource distribution,
timing, and type; experimental framing, i.e., how the experiment
is introduced; rules, i.e., rules of the game and payoff structure;
positions, i.e., network position, asymmetric commons, group
structure, and differential abilities; and information conditions,
i.e., communication, information displayed, and resource
visibility. However, different domains of use have different goals
and entail particular logistical constraints, influencing the design
of experiments and experimental platforms created for them. We
provide archetypal descriptions of use domains that use
experimental software to help clarify their influence on
methodological choices.
Laboratory research experiments
Social-ecological experiments conducted in university
laboratories are typically not focused on particular contextual
factors but often strive to ask basic scientific questions and seek
results that are generalizable across social and ecological
contexts. Laboratory experiments are also not as constrained by
particular contextual factors, or by logistical issues, and may be
substantially more complex (Janssen et al. 2010, Kimbrough and
Wilson 2013). In comparison to field experiments, laboratory
experiments are often employed to examine more theoretical
research questions, such as, “is social learning conformist in a
variable environment?” (McElreath et al. 2005).
Open online experiments
Behavioral experiments are also conducted online, e.g., using
Amazon’s distributed platform for computer-based labor,
Mechanical Turk (Horton et al. 2011, Rand and Nowak 2011,
Rand 2012). Open online experiments of this type partially
address the criticism that traditional laboratory experiments
often attempt to draw general conclusions about human behavior
from an unrepresentative student population (Henrich et al.
2010). Open online experiments for social-ecological systems
research promise to increase participation and cultural and ethnic
diversity in experimental results, but they also come with
significant challenges associated with identity and behavioral
verification and validation. Experiments with Mechanical Turk
show similar results as found in traditional experiments (Amir et
al. 2012).
Educational experiments
Social-ecological simulations are increasingly used in education,
where their form and function overlap significantly with research
experiments. However, research experiments often entail
additional social science measures such as surveys and follow-up
questionnaires and are tightly controlled to maintain conditions
such as anonymity to ensure high data quality. By contrast, in an
educational context, an experimental game can be used in
isolation but in combination with a lesson plan, thematic
exposition, and a group debriefing. The use of experiments has
been shown to increase comprehension of teaching material in
economics (Cartwright and Stepanova 2012) and therefore might
be explored as a teaching tool to teach governance of social-
ecological systems.
Description of platforms
We describe the publicly available software platforms for
performing behavioral experiments of relevance to social-
ecological systems. The results are compiled in a summary table
(Table 1). We provide for each software platform some illustrative
screenshots to show the variety of graphical user interfaces
employed.
Paper and pencil
The simplest experimental method is the “paper-and-pencil”
option. Its simplicity makes the paper-and-pencil approach a
natural alternative where software or technological options are
not appropriate. Even some elaborate experiments can be
conducted with paper and pencil (e.g., Cardenas et al. 2013).
Paper-and-pencil experiments are often used for field experiments
because of their logistical simplicity, physical reliability, and rapid
implementation. With clear forms and protocols, a well-trained
group of experimenters can run very successful experiments. In
each round, experimenters collect data from the participants,
perform the relevant calculations, and provide feedback to the
participants.  
Although a paper-and-pencil implementation can be
cumbersome, the simplicity of this approach has one important
benefit that technologically intensive solutions have yet to match.
Importantly, paper-and-pencil experiments are easy to prototype,
test, and modify. They effectively require zero investment in
equipment or software development, and as a result, paper-and-
pencil experiments can rapidly iterate in their design and quickly
move to data collection. Paper-and-pencil experiments suffer two
major drawbacks, however. First, they are limited in terms of the
attainable environmental and social complexity for any given
experiment. For example, including spatial and temporal
dynamics in an experiment quickly produces practical challenges
in implementation. Second, although calculations by
experimenters can be done more efficiently with spreadsheets,
data and forms must be processed manually, which introduces the
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Table 1. Comparison of experimental platforms on diverse criteria based on available documentation and expertise with the various
platforms.
 
Criteria Description z-Tree GameWeb CSID
framework†
VCWeb MobLab BoXS VeconLab NetLogo:
HubNet
ConG
Purpose Education, research,
both
research research research research education Research education both research
Participant
model
How do participants
join?‡
local/lab local/lab local/lab global in-class local/
global
in-class local/lab local/lab
Software
model
Is software
installation required?
yes yes yes no yes (app/
web)
yes no yes yes
Is the experiment
web-based?
no yes no yes Yes yes yes no No
Designed for local or
global network?
local local local global global global global local Local
Standard
games
How many games
come with the
software?
7 1 2 3 31 2 44 24 4
New games Capacity to create
new games
yes yes yes yes No yes no yes Yes
Communic­
ation
Is communication
possible between
participants?
yes yes yes yes No yes no yes Yes
Expertise What specific
knowledge and skills
are need to
implement a new
game?
z-Tree
language
php
(javascript)
Java,
network
and
graphics
programming
Python,
Django,
web
developm­
ent
NA Java php NetLogo
language
Java,
Processing,
networks &
graphics
Expertise level to run
games
medium medium medium medium Low medium low medium Medium
Expertise level to
implement games
medium high high high NA Medium NA medium High
Open-
source
Is the software open
source?
no yes yes yes No No? no yes no
Hardware Hardware
requirements
client/server
local
network
client/server
local
network
client/server
local
network
HTML5
capable
browser
HTML5
capable
browser
HTML5
capable
browser
HTML5
capable
browser
client/
server
local
network
client/
server local
network
OS Which operating
systems are
supported
Windows All All All All All All All All
Data
logging
How data is stored
and made available
for analysis
XLS file mySQL
database
Binary
format
PostgreSQL
database
Proprietary
spreadsheet
Can save
as csv file
database CSV file CSV file
Group Size
(max)
Supported group
sizes
? 20 25 hundreds hundreds ? hundreds 10 12
Document­
ation
Pages of
documentation
92 - - - 3 68 - 8 -
User
community
Size of user
community
large small small small unknown small small Very large Small
Literature Estimated # paper
published on
experiments in the
platform
> 1000 5 10 1 0 1 ? ? < 5
†CSID: Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity.
‡local/lab: no sign up, in-class: instructor controlled, global: via email, other online identity).
potential for errors. As a consequence, there is a limited
complexity that can be managed through paper-and-pencil
experiments.
z-Tree
The Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments, or
z-Tree (http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree), was developed in the 1990s
by economist Urs Fischbacher (2007) and has become a standard
tool among experimental economists. z-Tree is a client-server
Windows application that comes with many standard economics
experiments (http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree/treatments.php), including
social dilemmas and auction markets. It also provides a
programming environment in which new experiments that
conform to its data and interaction model (http://www.iew.uzh.
ch/ztree/ztree21tutorial.pdf) can be rapidly developed via a
programmable interface. The software allows one to create and
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parameterize experimental treatments with support for custom
programming logic and common parameters such as number of
subjects, groups, group size, number of rounds, and show-up fees.
z-Tree uses a round-based experimental structure to organize
interactions as do many such software solutions. Although the
latest version offers graphical capabilities, the software is not
designed to provide engaging visualizations and interactions and
typically relies on participants making text input decisions based
on textual feedback (Fig. 2). The software is closed source and
freely available and must be installed on participants’ computers
or virtual machines running Microsoft Windows with a shared
network drive.
Fig. 2. A screenshot of z-Tree experimental software when a
public good is played.
GameWeb
GameWeb was developed in 2004 by anthropologist Richard
McElreath (http://gameweb.sourceforge.net) and is an open-
source, web-based platform implemented with PHP, MySQL, and
JavaScript for round-based, multiperson behavioral experiments
(Fig. 3; McElreath et al. 2005, 2008). GameWeb was designed to
overcome some of the limitations of z-Tree. It features separate
web consoles for participants and experimenters and can be
integrated with cursor-tracking software (http://mouselabweb.
org) to provide millisecond cursor-tracking data and reveal
changes in participants’ attention and information access, i.e.,
what information participants have viewed and for how long. The
use of standard languages also makes the modification of the
GameWeb engine possible. GameWeb can be deployed on any
computer device with a web browser and has been used on
handheld devices in areas with no electricity or Internet
connection (Waring and Bell 2013) and in laboratory settings
(McElreath et al. 2008). There is no ready-made menu of
experimental designs to select from, so experiments in GameWeb
must be implemented by the research team by extending the
GameWeb framework.
Bonn Experiment System
The Bonn Experiment System (BoXS) was developed by Mirko
Seithe (2012) and is a Java-based software system designed to
create and conduct experiments for laboratory environments as
well as Internet experiments (Fig. 4; http://boxs.uni-bonn.de/).
The experimental environment is relatively new and contains
examples for public good experiments and Dutch auctions.
Experimenters can create new experiments online using a Java
applet experiment builder. The participant interfaces are written
in HTML, and the examples are primarily text-based with
minimal graphical user interface support.
Fig. 3. A screenshot of the GameWeb experimental
environment when a public good is played.
Fig. 4. A screenshot of the BoXS experimental software.
Social-Ecological Systems Experimental Framework
The Social-Ecological Systems Experimental Framework
(SESEF) was developed by Allen Lee in 2006 at the Center for
the Study of Institutional Diversity and is an open-source, client-
server framework implemented in Java (https://bitbucket.org/
virtualcommons/sesef). It provides support for experiment
configuration via XML or properties files, data persistence,
networking, and graphics for group experiments. Two types of
experiments have been built on SESEF, a foraging game and an
irrigation game.  
The foraging game began development in the early 2000s to
investigate spatial foraging strategies (Goldstone and Ashpole
2004) and the influence of real-time changes in other participants’
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foraging patterns (Goldstone et al. 2005). It evolved to examine
how groups of participants interact with a renewable resource
under different conditions (Janssen et al. 2008, 2010) and is freely
available as open-source experimental software (http://bitbucket.
org/virtualcommons/foraging). Generated data files can be
exported to CSV for data analysis, and participants’ foraging
patterns can be converted into QuickTime movies so
experimenters can replay experiments.  
A key difference between this software and a package like z-Tree
is the way decisions are made. Instead of discrete rounds in which
participants make independent decisions in each round with
information from previous rounds, participants have a
configurable period of a specific number of minutes in which they
make real-time decisions on where to move in the spatially explicit
renewable resource and when to collect resources (see Fig. 5).
Participants will often click several times a second to maneuver
their avatar and collect resources. A software platform designed
for real-time continuous interactivity with graphics and network
synchronization capabilities is needed to support this kind of
dynamic interaction because the experiment’s game state must be
updated and transmitted efficiently to each member of a group
multiple times per second. Installation of the software requires
Java to be installed on the experimenter and client computers.
Experiment clients are installed and run from a web browser using
Java Web Start.
Fig. 5. The foraging game is a spatially explicit experimental
framework that allows for real-time resource use interactions:
(a) global view; (b) local view.
The irrigation game (https://bitbucket.org/virtualcommons/
irrigation) was developed using the same core engine as the
foraging game described previously but with game dynamics
addressing coordination and information asymmetry issues in
irrigation systems (Anderies et al. 2013). The game itself  consists
of multiple rounds where participants make infrastructure
investment decisions, have the option to communicate via text
chat, and engage in real-time decision making, i.e., controlling an
irrigation gate, during a specific amount of time (Fig. 6). The
experimental environment also includes configurable parameters
that introduce shocks to the water supply and infrastructure and
can limit the information participants can see about each other. 
Fig. 6. The irrigation game simulates a linear irrigation canal
with five users.
VCWeb
The Virtual Commons Web Environment (VCWeb; http://vcweb.
asu.edu) was developed in 2011 by Allen Lee and is an open-
source, web-based framework implemented in Python, Django,
and Bootstrap for developing and running collective action
experiments (Fig. 7). There is no need to install specialized
software beyond a modern web browser such as Chrome, Safari,
or Firefox, and experiments can be performed in a controlled
setting, e.g., computer lab, where the transition between rounds
in the experiment is managed by an experiment facilitator or in a
solely online setting where participants access the experiment via
a desktop or mobile browser. It offers real-time functionality
including text chat between groups or individuals, experiment
configuration and parameterization, and the ability for
experiment facilitators to synchronously advance all participants
from one round to the next. The software originated from a desire
to investigate issues of scale in collective action theory and to
conduct experiments with large groups of participants (Janssen
et al. 2013). Creation of new experiments requires experience with
Python and web development.
ConG
ConG (http://leeps.ucsc.edu/cong) is a specialized experimental
environment for continuous-time games for experimental
economics developed in 2009 and implemented in Java (Pettit et
al. 2012). Like GameWeb, experiment configuration is
implemented with CSV files and offers real-time interactivity and
visualization for several standard economics experiments
including the prisoner’s dilemma, hawk dove, and a voluntary
contribution mechanism public goods game. The existing
visualizations are similar to real-time graphs and implemented in
the PROCESSING language (Fig. 8; http://processing.org). They
offer PDF documents describing the experiments, but there are
no in-game instructional screens to explain the variables or
interaction model. The environment can be extended with
customized payoff functions and visualizations.
Ecology and Society 19(4): 20
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art20/
Fig. 7. A screenshot of the VCWeb experimental environment of an experiment in which a group sees the actions
of another group.
Fig. 8. A screenshot of the ConG experimental environment in
which participants have a certain time to define their level of
investment in a public good.
VeconLab
VeconLab (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm) was
developed in 2005, offers 44 discrete-round, web-based economics
experiments, and is implemented in PHP. Instructors or
researchers can register for an account on their website and run
experiments. A sample experiment begins with a set of
instructions, a quiz to test for understanding, and then a number
of repeated discrete rounds of numerical decision making similar
to z-Tree or MobLab. The visual interface is primarily textual
with on-screen instructions, input validation, and contextual
descriptions of the experiments and their goals (Fig. 9).
Customization of the software would require contacting the
author because the software appears to be closed source and does
not document any known extension points.
MobLab
MobLab was developed in 2012 and is a start-up founded in 2011
developing proprietary interactive economics games that can be
run in the classroom using an HTML5-compatible web browser
or on Android and iOS mobile devices (http://www.moblab.com/).
They currently offer 22 standard games from experimental
economics including public good, prisoner’s dilemma, and
bargaining games with a focus on providing engaging user
interfaces. Experimenters can adjust basic parameters of the
experiments, i.e., payoff and number of participants, and decision
making occurs in discrete rounds (Fig. 10). Although this
experimental environment does not yet include more
comprehensive games with ecological dynamics, it is a viable
example of a tool for the classroom and is currently free for
academic use.
NetLogo/HubNet
NetLogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo) is a software
platform for developing agent-based models. NetLogo’s HubNet
participatory simulation system merges built-in local networking
abilities with an agent-based simulation engine commonly used
in education and research. HubNet allows complex spatial
simulations to be shared and allows users to manipulate them in
real time. Because of the NetLogo foundation, participatory
simulations can include much more complex and dynamic and
Ecology and Society 19(4): 20
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Fig. 9. A screenshot of the web-based VeconLab experiment. In
this example, a public good game is played.
spatial environments than other experimental systems we have
mentioned (see, e.g., Frey and Goldstone 2013). HubNet uses
NetLogo’s built-in user interface features, i.e., sliders, buttons,
spatial display, plots, and charts, to convey a rich, but constrained
participant experience (Fig. 11). HubNet uses NetLogo’s
simplified agent-oriented programming language. HubNet is well
documented, and experiments may be developed relatively
quickly. Although NetLogo’s HubNet architecture is capable of
real-time participatory simulations, it carries performance and
programmatic constraints as compared to a pure Java framework
like SESEF.
Fig. 10. A screenshot of the MobLab experimental
environment when a public good game is played.
Comparing platforms
We evaluated all the computer-based platforms on a number of
basic criteria for usability and performance, and we compared
these with our extensive experience with pencil-and-paper
experiments. Table 1 contains the results based on available
documentation and expertise with the various platforms. As a
group, we have a diverse but incomplete expertise with the
platforms presented, and therefore, we may not fully represent the
possibilities of all platforms. Most of our expertise is related to
SESEF, VCWeb, z-Tree, and GameWeb. However, our
comparison has revealed a few key features that distinguish
experimental platforms and tend to be associated with different
domains of use.  
Perhaps the most important consideration is whether one needs
ready-made experiments for quick deployment, as in an
educational setting, or a system on which to design a customized
experiment, as is often needed in research. For ready-made
experiments, z-Tree, MobLab, and VeconLab are good options.
If  a customized experiment is needed, selecting an open-source
framework such as ConG, BoXS, SESEF, GameWeb, or VCWeb
is recommended because the source code for the framework is
freely available and can be customized at will. Open-source
software offers the greatest potential for extension and conveys
the added benefits of advancing and contributing to a community
good. However, most open-source research frameworks,
including those the authors have developed, lack up-to-date and
thorough documentation. To be successful, these open-source
research platforms must learn from z-Tree and other successful
open-source projects, where clear, cogent, and well-structured
documentation is essential for fostering community adoption and
contribution. Currently, research groups work independently and
often reimplement slight variants of common problems:
organizing participants into groups, managing experiment
parameterizations and experiment data organized into multiple
treatments, and providing useful scaffolding for developing
server-side and client-side components tailored to the specific
research questions under investigation. Closed-source platforms
may offer extension points where custom logic can be placed, but
these are dependent on the platform authors. With platforms like
z-Tree, a large community has created and shared scripts of
variations of experimental treatments within the programming
logic supported by z-Tree and facilitated by its dedication to
creating useful documentation and other user support
mechanisms including active mailing lists and forums.  
Another important consideration is whether the platform requires
the installation of custom software on each computer running
the experiment or whether the experiment can be accessed via a
standard web browser. Web-based experiments offer a number of
advantages over traditional client-server software: they are always
up-to-date, can support larger group sizes, require no local
software installation, and are easily designed to be robust to
interruptions in network connectivity and other concurrency
issues. Real-time user interactivity is now possible with the advent
of web-sockets and HTML5-enabled web browsers such as
Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, or Apple Safari, though the
supporting technology is still emerging and in flux.  
The software used to generate published experimental results
should be archived and preserved as an important artifact in the
research process because it is essential to the reproducibility of
the experimental results. Open-source software is typically stored
on a web-hosted version control system such as SourceForge
(http://sourceforge.net), Bitbucket (https://bitbucket.org), or
GitHub (https://github.com). All modern version control systems
offer the ability to “tag” a software release, taking a snapshot of
the exact state of the code base and assigning it a symbolic name.
Proper usage of version control tagging and maintenance
branches should be used when generating publishable experiment
data using open-source software in active development. Care must
also be taken to include versions of all dependent libraries. An
added benefit of open-source software stored in version control
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Fig. 11. A screenshot of the visualization of the HubNet functionality of NetLogo.
systems is transparency because the commit history, a record of
every change that occurred in the code base, is always available.
Commits to version control systems are also typically e-mailed to
an archived mailing list, adding another layer of auditability and
redundancy. Closed-source experimental software by definition
lacks this type of transparency and furthermore cannot be
scrutinized for bugs that can manifest themselves in the generated
data. If  closed-source software is used, an archive of the specific
version of the software and any associated parameterizations,
scripts, or other customizations and dependencies should be
preserved along with the data.  
To create new experimental designs in any of the platforms,
programming expertise is needed to implement additional
experimental logic and the desired behavior. Table 1 lists the types
of programming expertise required. Platforms like z-Tree and
NetLogo are well-documented, have active communities
providing knowledgeable support, and are more accessible to
nonprogrammers. However, those platforms have a limited
capacity for real-time interaction and graphical visualizations
desirable for social-ecological experiments.  
To conclude, we believe there is no ideal platform that is free, user-
friendly, and makes it effortless to develop novel experiments to
study governance of detailed, complex social-ecological systems.
Instead, we identify three categories of experimental platforms.
We group the available systems into categories based on how well
each platform handles the concerns discussed previously.
Prototyping
Tools like paper-and-pencil games and NetLogo/HubNet are
excellent ways to develop prototype experiments as well as actual
experiments for research. If  experimental designs are simple, these
tools can also be used for actual experiments. The benefits will be
the rapid development of the specific software without specialized
programming experience. A drawback is the lack of
customization for experimentation, meaning that running the
experiments might be ad hoc using manual calculations and
interventions.
Educational games
Two platforms, MobLab and VeconLab, are excellent resources
for running experiments in classrooms. They have been used in
many classes and have proved to be robust. However, because the
games offered in these platforms are standard games, and there
is no ability to create new games, the platforms are not useful for
use in research that requires novel game designs.
Research platforms
Research platforms such as z-Tree, ConG, BoXS, SESEF,
GameWeb, and VCWeb can be used to develop different types of
specialized round-based experiments. They differ in the expertise
needed and the kind of experiments for which they are used. z-
Tree was the first platform of its kind and is common in
experimental economics in general; ConG focuses on experiments
with continuous, instead of discrete, decision making; GameWeb
is mainly used for experiments on cultural learning; BoXS is a
new web-based platform; SESEF focuses on controlled social-
ecological system experiments in a lab; and VCWeb is used for
online experiments that can also be conducted via mobile devices
outside the lab. All these platforms can be used to develop new
experiments if  you know the right programming languages.
Discussion
The previous discussion on platforms provides an incomplete
overview of the tools available. We focused on experimental
platforms that can be used for the study of the governance of
social-ecological systems and that are easily available. Some
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scholars have developed relevant platforms for their own research
but have not made them generally available (Hey et al. 2009,
Kimbrough and Wilson 2013).  
For novices to experimental methods, good starting points are
the use of paper-and-pencil games, as well as platforms like
VeconLab, MobLab, and z-Tree. For those options, no specific
programming skills are needed to make use of a library of
experimental treatments. For more advanced research that
includes specific social-ecological features, platforms like SESEF
and VCWeb would be useful. SESEF offers the greatest possibility
for dynamic environments and user interfaces but also requires
the highest level of programming skills. As an alternative,
NetLogo/HubNet would be very appropriate to use for
experiments with complex dynamic environments. The main
drawback of using NetLogo/HubNet is the limited control over
how participants see the information.  
Good starting points for novices do not require programming
experience, but the platforms lack specific focus on social-
ecological systems and have limited control over the information
participants see during communication. Better quality software
is available, though these options require extensive programming
experience and, often, significant time investments. Experimental
software is complex because it must maintain data integrity across
concurrent access to experimental data, be robust to crashes and
heterogeneous network conditions, and handle all the special case
needs for running multiple parameterized treatments.
Furthermore, implementing novel experiments on top of an
existing framework often requires changes to the framework that
were not in the original design and require deep knowledge to
implement properly.  
The development of robust platforms for more advanced
experiments that involve spatial and temporal dynamics of social-
ecological systems, including social-ecological networks, will
require advanced programming expertise to implement. Software
development has substantial investment costs and suffers from a
very high failure rate. In many cases, the software developed while
research funding is available is abandoned and falls into disuse
after the funding cycle is over. We believe that the research
community should be building on each other’s work in an open
and collaborative manner instead of continually reinventing the
wheel. We hope that the current trend of open-source
development of such experimental platforms will make it more
likely that such software platforms can continue to provide value
and be extended and maintained by the community.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6895
Acknowledgments:
The authors acknowledge financial support from Arizona State
University and from the National Science Foundation via grant
numbers 0748632 and 1210856.
LITERATURE CITED
Amir, O., D. G. Rand, and Y. K. Gal. 2012. Economic games on
the Internet: the effect of $1 stakes. PLoS ONE 7(2):e31461.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0031461  
Anderies, J. M., M. A. Janssen, F. Bousquet, J.-C. Cardenas, D.
Castillo, M.-C. Lopez, R. Tobias, B. Vollan, and A. Wutich. 2011.
The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies
of common pool resource governance. Ecological Economics 70
(9):1571-1579. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.011  
Anderies, J. M., M. A. Janssen, A. Lee, and H. Wasserman. 2013.
Environmental variability and collective action: experimental
insights from an irrigation game. Ecological Economics 
93:166-176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.04.010  
Balliet, D. 2010. Communication and cooperation in social
dilemmas: a meta-analytic review. Journal of Conflict Resolution
 54(1):39-57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002709352443  
Camerer, C. F. 2003. Behavioral game theory. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.  
Cardenas, J.-C. 2000. How do groups solve local commons
dilemmas? Lessons from experimental economics in the field.
Environment, Development and Sustainability 2(3-4):305-322.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011422313042  
Cardenas, J.-C., M. Janssen, and F. Bousquet. 2013. Dynamics of
rules and resources: three new field experiments on water, forests
and fisheries. Pages 319-345 in J. A. List and M. K. Price, editors.
Handbook on experimental economics and the environment. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/978­
1781009079.00020  
Cartwright, E., and A. Stepanova. 2012. What do students learn
from a classroom experiment: not much, unless they write a report
on it. Journal of Economic Education 43(1):48-57. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/00220485.2012.636710  
Castillo, D., F. Bousquet, M. A. Janssen, K. Worrapimphong,
and J. C. Cardenas. 2011. Context matters to explain field
experiments: results from Colombian and Thai fishing villages.
Ecological Economics 70(9):1609-1620. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ecolecon.2011.05.011  
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. C. Stern. 2003. The struggle to govern
the commons. Science 302(5652):1907-1912. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1126/science.1091015  
Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made
economic experiments. Experimental Economics 10(2):171-178.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4  
Frey, S., and Goldstone R. L. 2013. Cyclic game dynamics driven
by iterated reasoning. PLoS ONE 8(2):e56416. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0056416  
Friedman, D., and S. Sunder. 1994. Experimental methods: a
primer for economists. Cambridge University Press, New York,
New York, USA. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174176  
García-Gallego, A., N. Georgantzís, R. Hernán-González, and
P. Kujal. 2012. How do markets manage water resources? An
experiment. Environmental and Resource Economics 53:1-23.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9545-7  
Ecology and Society 19(4): 20
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art20/
Goldstone, R. L., and B. C. Ashpole. 2004. Human foraging
behavior in a virtual environment. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
 11:508-514. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03196603  
Goldstone, R. L., B. C. Ashpole, and M. E. Roberts. 2005.
Knowledge of resources and competitors in human foraging.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12:81-87. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3758/BF03196350  
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 
162:1243-1248. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243  
Harrison, G. W., and J. A. List. 2004. Field experiments. Journal
of Economic Literature 42(4):1009-1055. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1257/0022051043004577  
Henrich, J., S. J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan. 2010. The weirdest
people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33(2-3):61-83.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X  
Hey, J. D., T. Neugebauer, and A. Sadrieh. 2009. An experimental
analysis of optimal renewable resource management: the fishery.
Environmental and Resource Economics 44: 263-285. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10640-009-9285-5  
Horton, J. J., D. G. Rand, and R. J. Zeckhauser. 2011. The online
laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market.
Experimental Economics 14(3):399-425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10683-011-9273-9  
Janssen, M. A., R. L. Goldstone, F. Menczer, and E. Ostrom.
2008. Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive spatial
commons. International Journal of the Commons 2(2):288-312.  
Janssen, M. A., R. Holahan, A. Lee, and E. Ostrom 2010. Lab
experiments for the study of social-ecological systems. Science 
328:613-617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1183532  
Janssen, M. A., A. Lee, and H. Sundaram. 2013. Investing time
in the public good: a web-based threshold public good experiment. 
Center for Studies of Institutional Diversity (CSID) Working
Paper Series, #CSID-2013-011. CSID, Arizona State University,
Tempe, Arizona, USA. [online] URL: https://csid.asu.edu/sites/
csid.asu.edu/files/csid_wp_2013-011.pdf  
Kimbrough, E. O., and B. J. Wilson. 2013. Insiders, outsiders, and
the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks. Ecological
Economics 90:29-40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.02.008  
McAllister, R. R. J., J. G. Tisdell, A. F. Reeson, and I. J. Gordon.
2011. Economic behavior in the face of resource variability and
uncertainty. Ecology and Society 16(3): 6. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5751/ES-04075-160306  
McElreath, R., A. V. Bell, C. Efferson, M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson,
and T. Waring. 2008. Beyond existence and aiming outside the
laboratory: estimating frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased
social learning strategies. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B 363:3515-3528. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0131  
McElreath, R., M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson, T. M. Waring, W.
Baum, E. Edsten, C. Efferson, and B. Paciotti. 2005. Applying
evolutionary models to the laboratory study of social learning.
Evolution & Human Behavior 26(6):483-508. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.04.003  
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of
institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763  
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.  
Ostrom, E. 2009. A general framework for analyzing the
sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science 325
(5939):419-422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1172133  
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker. 1994. Rules, games, and
common-pool resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, USA.  
Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants with and
without a sword: self-governance is possible. American Political
Science Review 86(2):404-417.  
Pettit, J., D. Friedman, C. Kephart, and R. Oprea. 2012.
Continuous game experiments. Economics Department,
University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara,
California, USA.  
Poteete, A. M., M. A. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2010. Working
together: collective action, the commons and multiple methods in
practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
USA.  
Prediger, S., B. Vollan, and M. Frölich. 2011. The impact of
culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource
experiment. Ecological Economics 70(9):1599-1608. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.08.017  
Rand, D. G. 2012. The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online
labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 299:172-179. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004  
Rand, D. G., and M. A. Nowak. 2011. The evolution of antisocial
punishment in optional public goods games. Nature
Communications 2:434. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1442  
Roth, A. E., and J. Kagel, editors. 1995. Handbook of experimental
economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
USA.  
Seithe, M. 2012. Introducing the Bonn Experiment System
(BoXS). Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, No. 01/2012. University
of Bonn, Bonn, Germany.  
Waring, T. M., and A. V. Bell. 2013. Ethnic dominance damages
cooperation more than ethnic diversity: results from multi-ethnic
field experiments in India. Evolution & Human Behavior 34
(6):398-404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.07.003
